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WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES 





The relative constancy of nonfinancial corporate tax revenues as a share of U.S. GDP masks 
offsetting trends in the ratio of corporate profits to GDP (declining) and the average tax rate 
(increasing). The average tax rate rose steadily between 1996 and 2003, an increase largely 
attributable to the importance of tax losses. This rise casts some doubt on the role of tax 
planning activities in reducing corporate taxes. So, too, does the relative stability of the rate of 
profit (relative to net assets), which might be expected to have declined had the 
understatement of profits for tax purposes been increasing. 
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I. Introduction 
  Corporate income taxes present a challenge for economists.  Their incidence has 
seemed particularly difficult to assign
1 and there have been persistent questions about the 
logic of a separate tax on corporations (e.g., McLure 1979).  In recent years, the pressures of 
financial innovation and international tax competition have presented new challenges to 
countries seeking to maintain a corporate tax, leading to further questions about the role of 
this tax as a component of tax structure.  Yet corporate taxes remain an integral component of 
national tax systems.  In this paper, I review the recent evolution of U.S. corporate tax 
collections, considering the factors that have contributed to the relatively small share of 
federal tax revenues for which they account in order to gain insight into the future of the U.S. 
corporate income tax. 
  Figure 1 shows U.S corporate income taxes as a share of GDP and of federal revenues 
for fiscal years from 1962 through 2005.  The two series track each other closely because 
overall revenues as a share of GDP have remained rather stable during the period, with an 
average just below 20 percent.  During most of the 1960s, corporate taxes accounted for more 
than one fifth of revenues and nearly 4 percent of GDP.  But these figures fell steadily during 
the 1970s and early 1980s so that, by 1983, corporate taxes accounted for just 1 percent of 
GDP and 6 percent of federal revenues.  This decline prompted an examination by Auerbach 
and Poterba (1987), who developed a methodology for attributing changes in corporate tax 
revenues to different sources.  Their decomposition assigned some of the decline in the 
importance of the corporate tax to a fall in corporate profitability and some to a fall in the 
corporate average tax rate, the latter to a considerable extent attributable to changes in capital 
recovery provisions.  Subsequent analyses using the Auerbach-Poterba methodology 
considered why corporate revenues did not increase by as much as predicted after the Tax 
                                                 
1 For a recent survey of the literature, see Auerbach (2006)   2
Reform Act of 1986 (Poterba 1992) and why corporate taxes collections rebounded during 
the 1990s, even as the demise of the corporate tax was being predicted (Mackie 1999). 


































































  Corporate taxes fell in nominal terms between 1998 and 1999 as the economy grew 
strongly and fell sharply again as a share of GDP and of revenues in 2001.  These 
developments helped prompt examinations of the potential role of corporate tax shelters in 
eroding the corporate tax base (e.g., Desai 2003).  But, since a local trough in 2003, corporate 
tax collections have rebounded so strongly that they accounted for a higher share of revenues 
and GDP in 2005 than in any fiscal year since the 1970s. 
  To help understand these recent developments and get a sense of the role that different 
factors will play in the future, I apply and extend the Auerbach-Poterba methodology to 
examine the trends in taxes paid by nonfinancial corporations from 1983 through 2003, 
starting in 1983 to provide a few years’ overlap with the original Auerbach-Poterba analysis, 
which ended its sample in 1985.  The Appendix describes the methodology and data sources 
used.   3
II. Corporate Taxes, Assets and Profitability 
  The first column of Table 1 shows the taxes paid by all corporations during the period 
1983-2003, scaled by GDP, tracking the corresponding series in Figure 1 except that (1) tax 
years are used, and (2) some adjustments to the measure of taxes are made, as outlined in the 
Appendix, to reflect the timing distinction between tax payments and the accrual of tax 
liability.  The next column of the table excludes the taxes paid by financial corporations.  
Because a significant share of the financial corporate sector (such as insurance companies 
and mutual funds) is subject to a variety of special tax regimes, it is useful to exclude 
financial corporations when considering the importance of broad tax provisions; following 
Auerbach and Poterba, I do so and consider only nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) for the 
remainder of the paper.  However, a comparison of the first two columns of Table 1 does 
reveal an increase in the importance of financial corporations among corporate taxpayers.  In 
1983, financial corporations accounted for just over 5 percent of all corporate revenues, but 
this share rose fairly steadily until, over the period 1991-2003, financial corporations 
accounted for roughly one quarter of all corporate tax revenues.  Without further analysis, it 
is not possible to exclude changes in tax rules as a contributing factor, but the growing 
importance of the financial sector seems an obvious primary explanation for the observed 
trend. 
  The third column of Table 1 divides the taxes of NFCs by the estimated replacement 
cost of net assets (assets net of credit market debt) held by nonfinancial C corporations, or 
CNFCs.  A growing share of corporate assets is held by S corporations, which legally are 
corporations but are not liable for corporate income taxes, their earnings being passed directly   4
to shareholders prior to taxation.  As corporate taxes are paid only by C corporations, 
therefore, it is useful to use C corporation assets in forming a tax-assets ratio.
2 
Table 1. Federal Corporate Revenues, 1983-2003 
NFC Taxes as a Percent of:   
Year 
Corporate 
Taxes as a 
Percent of GDP GDP CNFC  Assets 
1983  1.33 1.26 1.36 
1984  1.50 1.41 1.70 
1985  1.38 1.20 1.57 
1986  1.48 1.22 1.81 
1987  1.80 1.51 2.42 
1988  1.83 1.53 2.57 
1989  1.74 1.40 2.49 
1990  1.63 1.32 2.42 
1991  1.48 1.10 2.12 
1992  1.68 1.19 2.69 
1993  1.84 1.26 3.27 
1994  1.93 1.47 3.77 
1995  2.11 1.50 3.96 
1996  2.18 1.55 4.15 
1997  2.20 1.58 4.31 
1998  2.03 1.63 4.47 
1999  2.02 1.66 4.43 
2000  1.98 1.62 4.08 
2001  1.36 1.06 2.73 
2002  1.20 0.89 2.34 
2003  1.57 1.16 3.29 
                                                 
2 NFC net corporate assets at replacement cost are calculated using data from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
accounts.  They equal assets at replacement cost, as provided by the accounts, minus credit market debt adjusted 
to market values from the book values provided by the accounts using a perpetual inventory method described in 
the Appendix.  Because we do not have a breakdown of NFC assets into those of C and S corporations, we 
assume that the share of net NFC assets accounted for by C corporations is the same as the C corporation share 
of gross assets, at book value, based on annual assets of active corporations (excluding those in Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate) as reported by the IRS.   5
  While NFC revenues as a share of GDP fluctuated with the business cycle but without 
any obvious trend between 1983 and 2003, these revenues as a share of CNFC assets have 
increased over the same period.  The difference in trends between columns 2 and 3 reflects 
the fact that the size of the nonfinancial C corporation sector, as measured by assets, has been 
falling relative to GDP and other aggregate measures of activity.  Indeed, GDP grew over 2.6 
times more rapidly over the two decades between 1983 and 2003.  Part of this decline in the 
importance of CNFC assets comes from the increase in the share of corporate assets held by S 
corporations.  But, in terms of pure accounting, the slow growth in NFC assets as a whole and 
the increasing debt-assets ratio are much more important.
3  I consider this decline in NFC 
assets further below. 
  The last column of Table 1 leaves us with a new question: why have corporate tax 
revenues increased, relative to their related asset base? To explore this question, Table 2 
breaks down the ratio of taxes to assets into the product of two components, the ratio of taxes 
to profits – the average tax rate – and the ratio of profits to assets – the profit rate, where 
profits are an adjusted measure of CNFC profits, the calculation of which is described in the 
Appendix.  The first two columns of the table provide this breakdown of the tax-assets ratio, 
repeated from Table 1 for convenience in the last column. 
  The profit rate, shown in Table 2’s second column, has been strongly procyclical, 
rising with the expansion of the 1980s, falling slightly during the mild recession of 1990-91, 
rising very sharply during the extended boom later in the 1990s, falling once again with the 
recession of 2001 and beginning to recover again in 2003.  Profit rates were especially high 
during the period 1993-99, during which federal revenues, including not only corporate taxes 
                                                 
3 Our method of calculating net CNFC assets is to subtract NFC credit market debt from NFC assets and then 
multiply the resulting amount by the share of CNFC assets of all (C and S) NFC assets.  Thus, the ratio of net 
CNFC assets to GDP is r = f*a*(1-d), where f is the ratio of C assets to C + S assets, a is the ratio of total NFC 
assets to GDP, and d is the debt-assets ratio for the NFC sector.  Decomposing the changes in r between 1983 
and 2003 (in the order in which the terms appear in the expression for r), the rise in S corporations accounts for 
9 percent of the decline in r, the decline in NFC assets relative to GDP accounts for 43 percent of the decline in 
r, and the increase in the NFC debt-assets ratio accounts for 47 percent of the decline in r.   6
but also individual income taxes, surged.  But there is no obvious or significant trend in the 
rate of profit, which in recent years has fallen in the same range as at the beginning of the 
sample period. 
  Table 2. The Average Tax Rate and Corporate Profitability, 1983-2003 







1983  27.02 5.03 1.36 
1984  23.84 7.11 1.70 
1985  21.91 7.17 1.57 
1986  26.24 6.89 1.81 
1987  29.51 8.19 2.42 
1988 24.65  10.41  2.57 
1989  28.31 8.78 2.49 
1990  27.18 8.90 2.42 
1991  28.91 7.35 2.12 
1992  32.77 8.22 2.69 
1993 29.97  10.89  3.27 
1994 29.76  12.65  3.77 
1995 30.60  12.96  3.96 
1996 29.24  14.19  4.15 
1997 30.09  14.32  4.31 
1998 33.63  13.30  4.47 
1999 36.87  12.02  4.43 
2000  41.06 9.94 4.08 
2001  49.23 5.55 2.73 
2002  46.31 5.05 2.34 
2003  45.23 7.27 3.29   7
  The average tax rate, on the other hand, does show evidence of a trend, averaging 
below 25 percent during the first few years of the sample
4 and exceeding 40 percent in every 
year since 2000.  Although year to year fluctuations make higher frequency trends more 
difficult to discern, the average tax rate appears to have increased in the late ‘80s and once 
again in the late ‘90s, with the period in between, from around 1987-1997, characterized by a 
tax rate relatively stable around 30 percent.  The first of these increases is consistent with 
what one might have expected, as it coincides with the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, which sought to increase the share of federal revenues coming from the corporate 
income tax.  But the much larger increase in recent years has no obvious legislative 
explanation, and the concern about corporate tax shelters and heightened corporate tax 
avoidance already discussed would seem to have predicted a movement in the other direction. 
III. A Decomposition of Changes in the Average Tax Rate 
Table 3 sheds light on these movements in the average tax rate, breaking them down 
into six mutually exclusive components, the construction of which is described in the 
Appendix.  The first column of the table shows the statutory corporate tax rate for the 
corresponding year, while the last column shows the average tax rate, repeated from Table 2.  
The columns in between show the contributions of different factors to the gap between the 
statutory and average tax rates, with positive components increasing the average tax rate and 
negative components decreasing them. 
The second column of Table 3 is labeled “capital recovery” and (when negative) 
accounts for reductions in the average tax rate attributable to investment-related tax benefits 
greater than what would be provided by economic depreciation deductions.  This component 
also accounts for the use of historic cost in measuring depreciation allowances, a factor that 
                                                 
4 The profit rates are somewhat higher and the average tax rates correspondingly lower for the period 1983-85 
than those reported in the comparable table in Auerbach and Poterba (1987), the changes due primarily to 
revisions in the national income account components of the profit measure.   8
by itself would increase the average tax rate, but on balance capital recovery provisions have 
contributed to a reduction in the average tax rate.  This was especially true until 1986, when 
the investment tax credit was repealed.  In the years since, capital recovery provisions led to a 
relatively stable reduction in the average tax rate until 2002.  The explanation for this recent 
rise is the fall in the rate of profit already discussed.  Because capital recovery provisions are 
based on assets, rather than profits, a decline in the rate of profit will increase the ratio of 
capital recovery provisions to profits.  Put another way, a tax benefit of a given absolute 
magnitude reduces the average tax rate more when profits and hence the taxes on those 
profits fall. 



















1983 46.0  -22.9  -5.9  10.6  1.7  -3.6  1.0  27.0 
1984 46.0  -19.8  -6.3 7.8  1.1  -3.8 -1.2  23.8 
1985 46.0  -21.7  -6.4 9.6  0.0  -3.9 -1.7  21.9 
1986 46.0  -15.9  -8.0  10.4  1.7  -4.9 -3.0  26.2 
1987 40.0  -9.7  -5.8 6.1  3.2  -2.0 -2.2  29.5 
1988 34.0  -7.0  -5.6 3.4  1.1  0.1 -1.4  24.7 
1989 34.0  -7.0  -7.5 6.6  2.6  0.3 -0.5  28.3 
1990 34.0  -5.9 -10.4 6.2  2.5  1.4 -0.6 27.2 
1991 34.0  -4.6 -12.1  10.0  1.6  0.8 -0.8 28.9 
1992 34.0  -4.7  -7.5 9.4  2.2  1.0 -1.6  32.8 
1993 35.0  -4.7  -7.1 6.3  2.0  0.2 -1.7  30.0 
1994 35.0  -4.8  -4.8 3.6  1.8  0.2 -1.2  29.8 
1995 35.0  -5.1  -3.6 3.4  2.3  0.1 -1.5  30.6 
1996 35.0  -5.4  -4.9 4.3  1.9  -0.1 -1.5  29.2 
1997 35.0  -5.9  -4.9 4.9  2.1  0.3 -1.4  30.1 
1998 35.0  -6.2  -4.9 8.8  2.4  -0.2 -1.3  33.6 
1999 35.0  -6.8  -5.3  11.6  3.6  -0.2 -1.0  36.9 
2000 35.0  -6.8  -7.7  18.3  3.9  -0.1 -1.7  41.1 
2001 35.0  -8.1 -19.6  38.3  5.5  -0.4 -1.6 49.2 
2002 35.0  -17.1 -13.4  35.9  6.1  -0.2  0.1  46.3 
2003 35.0  -11.5 -10.2  30.1  2.8  -0.4 -0.5 45.2 
   9
The next column of Table 3, “other inflation,” accounts for two offsetting effects of 
inflation, the general overtaxation of profits due to inventory accounting (the understatement 
of the cost of goods sold) and the undertaxation of the economic gains on nominal liabilities.  
Once again, the net impact could go either way but throughout the period has on balance 
reduced average tax rates.  As with capital recovery provisions, this component’s impact on 
the average tax rate has tended to be larger in low-profit years, ceteris paribus. 
The factors considered thus far only deepen the puzzle of why average tax rates have 
risen in recent years.  The next component, though, points strongly in the other direction.  
The column labeled “Tax Losses” takes account of changes in the average tax rate due to the 
asymmetric treatment of gains and losses under the corporate income tax.  There are two 
pieces included in this component.  First, firms with negative taxable income can deduct 
losses only to the extent that these losses can be carried back and offset against the profits of 
earlier years.  Thus, the lack of a tax refund on losses not carried back increases the average 
tax rate.  On the other hand, taxable firms may deduct losses carried forward from earlier 
years, thereby shielding current profits from taxation and lowering the average tax rate.  
Whether the net effect is to decrease or increase the average tax rate in a given year depends 
on whether deductions for previous net operating losses exceed current losses not carried 
back.  While in principle the sign could go either way in a given year, in all years of the 
sample the net effect is positive, meaning that tax asymmetries increase the average corporate 
tax rate.  As one would expect, the impact is cyclical, stronger in the early ‘90s, for example, 
than later in the decade once the economy boomed.  But the recent pattern is truly 
remarkable, the addition to the average tax rate far exceeding that in earlier years, even 
during and just after recessions. 
Table 4 provides a closer look at the recent behavior of this tax loss component.  The 
table’s first column lists the income subject to tax for nonfinancial C corporations for the   10
years 1996-2003.  This is the aggregate income of companies with positive taxable income 
and shows the expected cyclical pattern, peaking in 2000 and falling in nominal terms in the 
recession year 2001 and again in 2002 before recovering in 2003.  The next column, listing 
the negative current income for remaining firms, holds the key to the recent growth in the 
importance of tax law asymmetries.  Negative income grew sharply between 1996 and 2002 
to the point that net income (income subject to tax plus negative income) was barely positive 
in 2002.  Only a small portion of this negative income was carried back against the income on 
previous years’ tax returns, as the next column of the table shows,
5 and net operating 
deductions for previous losses offset only a small portion of these nondeductible current 
losses.  As a result, nondeductible current losses net of NOL deductions rose from about 11 
percent of income subject to tax in 1996-7 to around 44 percent in 2001-3. 
Table 4. Elements of Tax Law Asymmetries, U.S. Nonfinancial C Corporations 1996-








NTI Net of 
Carrybacks 
NTI Net of 
CBs and 
NOLs 
1996  478.6  -110.1 -95.7 -51.2 
1997  508.9 -128.2 -109.2  -60.0 
1998  550.2 -178.8 -152.0 -106.6 
1999  580.9 -223.6 -193.9 -139.0 
2000  638.7 -312.2 -270.9 -202.5 
2001  528.1 -391.0 -293.1 -241.4 
2002  486.5 -370.8 -264.2 -207.6 
2003  554.3 -353.3 -301.1 -245.2 
 
 
                                                 
5 Because carrybacks are expressed as tax refunds rather than as deductions, I divide them by the effective tax 
rate on taxable income defined in the Appendix, τλ, to estimate the value of current losses carried back.  This is 
consistent with expression (A3), which defines the contribution of losses to the average tax rate by multiplying 
negative taxable income and NOLs but not carrybacks by τλ.   11
The resulting recent impact on the average tax rate in Table 3 is substantially higher 
than in any year since 1983, and higher than in any year estimated by Auerbach and Poterba 
(1987), who found the largest increase in the average tax rate between 1959 and 1985 to have 
been 22 percentage points during the very serious recession year of 1982.  As nondeductible 
losses translate into average tax rate increases based on the statutory rate, which was 
substantially higher in 1982 than in recent years (46 percent versus the current 35 percent), 
the contributions to the average tax rate in 2001-3 represent an impact of tax losses that is 
roughly double that of 1982. 
How is one to explain this unprecedented significance of losses? It is true that the 
2001 recession was relatively mild overall, but also that profits fell quite sharply around the 
same time.  According to NIPA data, domestic profits of nonfinancial corporations (with 
capital consumption and inventory valuation adjustments) divided by the GDP deflator fell by 
14 percent from 1981 to 1982, but by 38 percent from 1999 to 2001.  The fall in real profits is 
stronger in both periods if one starts earlier at a relative peak, but still much stronger for the 
recent period – by 19 percent between 1979 and 1982 and by 43 percent between 1997 and 
2001.  But one reason for the higher recent drop in profits is that profits were very high 
before the drop, and Table 4 shows that losses were significant even during the high-profit 
boom years of the late 1990s.
6  Moreover, losses remained large even as profits recovered in 
2003.  Thus, it appears that the increasing importance of losses is due not simply a downward 
shift in the distribution of the rate of profit among firms, but also a greater dispersion in the 
rate of profit, causing many firms to have losses even when the overall rate of profit is not 
low.  Although this explanation is difficult to verify using aggregate data, it is consistent with 
recent empirical evidence of increasing idiosyncratic volatility of various real measures of 
firm performance.  Surveying this evidence, Comin and Philippon (2005) argue that increases 
                                                 
6 In 1999, for example, negative taxable income was 38 percent of income subject to tax, close to the previous 
high of 42 percent ratio reached in the serious recession year 1982.   12
in product-market competition and capital market access have played a role in this increasing 
volatility. 
How does the importance of tax losses relate to recent concerns about the viability of 
the corporate tax? While there has been concern about the possible understatement of income, 
it is difficult to see how tax shelters and heightened tax avoidance activity can be implicated, 
given that such activity would be of far less value to taxpayers without current tax liability or 
the ability to carry losses back.  Indeed, as one tax avoidance strategy involves using 
transactions between parties with different tax status to reduce overall tax liability, one might 
have expected increases in tax avoidance behavior to have reduced the significance of 
nondeductible losses, with loss-making firms transferring such losses to taxable firms which 
could make better use of them.
7 
Returning to Table 3, none of the remaining three components are as important in 
explaining the gap between the statutory and average tax rates as those already considered.  
“Foreign Tax Effects” equals the taxes due on foreign source earnings in excess of foreign 
tax credits.  Because we are measuring the tax rate relative to domestic profits, the taxes paid 
on foreign earnings represent an increase in the average tax rate.  The contribution of this 
term has grown somewhat over time, with the increasing importance of multinational 
corporations.  However, the very recent increase in 2001-2 is due to primarily to a reduction 
in the denominator of the tax rate calculation, domestic profits. 
The next column of Table 3, labeled “Progressivity,” accounts for the fact that taxes 
before credits do not equal the product of the statutory tax rate and income subject to tax, as 
they would under a proportional tax system.  There are two reasons for this.  First, the 
corporate income tax structure has a small element of progressivity at very low levels of 
                                                 
7 The ability of firms without taxable income to transfer deductions to other firms through “safe harbor” leasing 
helped reduce the cross-firm dispersion of income in the early ‘80s, but this provision was repealed early in 
1982.  See Warren and Auerbach (1983)   13
income, which reduces the average tax rate.  Second, the corporate minimum tax imposes an 
extra tax burden on some firms, thereby increasing the average tax rate.  The net impact of 
these two offsetting effects is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but always small 
in magnitude.  The same is true of the remaining, residual category that picks up the effects 
of tax credits other than the investment and foreign tax credits and national income account 
retabulations. 
In summary, the average tax rate on the domestic income of nonfinancial C 
corporations has increased in recent years, with the unprecedented impact of tax losses more 
than offsetting other factors tending to reduce corporate tax burdens. 
IV. Factors in the Change in Corporate Tax Revenues 
  Table 3 provides an exhaustive decomposition of changes in tax revenues, given the 
profits of nonfinancial C corporations.  As discussed in relation to Table 2, the rate of profit 
for such corporations exhibits no obvious trend.  But there are factors that could reduce both 
net assets and profits, having no necessary impact on the rate of profit but still reducing 
corporate taxes.  Two such factors, already discussed, are the increased debt-assets ratios of 
nonfinancial corporations and the growth of S corporations.  The overall reduction in taxes 
associated with such factors is likely lower than the reduction in corporate taxes, because of 
the increased individual tax liabilities of recipients of interest payments and S corporation 
income.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider the role that these factors may have played 
in the evolution of corporate tax collections. 
  Of course, it is impossible to know what corporate tax collections would have been 
without the growth of debt and S corporations, but we can get an idea of the magnitude with 
some simple calculations, in particular what corporate taxes would have been without interest 
deductions or if all S corporation profits had been taxed at the average tax rate in Tables 2 
and 3.  These effects of these two counterfactual calculations on NFC revenues as a share of   14
GDP are given in the second and third columns of Table 5, the first column of which repeats 
the series for actual revenues as a share of GDP from Table 1. 
Table 5. Contributions to Changes in Corporate Tax Revenues, 1983-2003 
  NFC Taxes as a Share of GDP 
Year  Actual  No Debt  No S Corps  Equal FOC 
Tax/Assets 
 
1983  1.26 2.70 1.30 1.33 
1984  1.41 2.89 1.46 1.48 
1985  1.20 2.62 1.26 1.28 
1986  1.22 2.60 1.29 1.29 
1987  1.51 2.59 1.69 1.58 
1988  1.53 2.52 1.72 1.60 
1989  1.40 2.51 1.61 1.47 
1990  1.32 2.36 1.48 1.39 
1991  1.10 2.07 1.29 1.19 
1992  1.19 2.04 1.46 1.28 
1993  1.26 1.97 1.53 1.35 
1994  1.47 2.23 1.80 1.56 
1995  1.50 2.44 1.84 1.60 
1996  1.55 2.38 1.94 1.66 
1997  1.58 2.47 2.02 1.66 
1998  1.63 3.02 2.11 1.68 
1999  1.66 2.98 2.22 1.70 
2000  1.62 3.19 2.20 1.65 
2001  1.06 2.45 1.74 1.09 
2002  0.89 1.96 1.54 0.91 
2003  1.16 2.12 1.84 1.19 
   15
  Eliminating interest deductions, of course, increases corporate tax revenues.
8  
However, there is no clear trend to this adjustment between 1983 and 2003, as the declines in 
the statutory corporate rate and the nominal interest rate over the period have offset the rise in 
debt-asset ratios.  By contrast, taxing S corporation profits would have increased the growth 
rate of corporate tax collections, given the growth of S corporation assets and profits as a 
share of the corporate total, especially in recent years when C corporation profits declined so 
much. 
  The last experiment in Table 5 is motivated by another potential tax avoidance 
channel, profit shifting by multinationals.  Over the years, some have suggested that both 
U.S. and foreign multinationals use transfer pricing and other mechanisms to shift taxable 
profits from the United States to lower-tax jurisdictions.  In fact, this behavior has been seen 
as leading to increasing tax competition among countries and declines in statutory corporate 
tax rates (e.g., Devereux et al. 2002).  The responsiveness of the location of both investment 
and profits to tax incentives is the subject of a considerable literature and beyond the scope of 
this paper, but the last column in Table 5 provides a measure of the potential importance of 
one channel through which such activity operates.  The column indicates how much higher 
U.S. corporate taxes would have been if foreign-controlled U.S. subsidiaries, presumably 
with access to profit-shifting opportunities, had the same tax-assets ratio as other domestic 
corporations.  Under this assumption, taxes of U.S. nonfinancial corporations would have 
been higher, because foreign-owned companies have consistently had lower tax-assets ratios.  
The effect is small throughout the period, given the relatively small gap between tax-assets 
                                                 
8 Simulating the elimination of interest deductions requires some calculation of the tax savings generated by 
those deductions, which is complicated by the fact that firms vary in their ability to deduct interest and any 
given firm’s tax status is endogenous with respect to the interest deductions themselves.  Graham (1999) 
produces estimates of the marginal tax rates before and after interest deductions for a large universe of firms, as 
well as means, medians, and other percentiles of the distribution of before-interest and after-interest marginal 
tax rates.  To take account of the impact of interest deductions on tax status, I use the average of Graham’s mean 
before-interest and mean after-interest marginal tax rates for each year in my sample, based on unpublished 
updates of the series in Graham (1999) kindly provided by John Graham.   16
ratios and the relatively small share of U.S. companies that are foreign-controlled.  But there 
are many other channels for international tax avoidance and behavioral responses, as through 
the shifting abroad of profits by U.S.-owned companies and the movement of activities 
themselves, which would show up as a decline in assets in the United States. 
V. Other Considerations 
  This paper has examined many of the factors contributing to the evolution of the 
corporate income tax as a revenue source in the United States, breaking these down into those 
affecting the average tax rate on corporate profits and those affecting corporate profits 
themselves.  The measure of profits used has been is based on profits declared for tax 
purposes, with a few transparent adjustments.  As shown in Table 2, there has been no 
obvious trend in the rate of profit based on this measure, which suggests that the decline in 
the profits of CNFCs as a share of GDP is traceable to the decline in CNFC net assets, 
attributable to the growth of S corporations, increased debt-assets ratios, and the decline in 
the size of NFC assets.  Part of the explanation for the decline in NFC assets may be a shift in 
domestic industrial composition from nonfinancial to financial activities, as discussed in 
relation to Table 1.  But the downward trend in NFC assets may also be overstated by the 
focus on tangible assets.  A more comprehensive asset measure that includes the value of 
capitalized intangibles would not only be larger, but likely would also have a different trend, 
given estimates of the increasing importance of intangible assets in relation to tangible 
assets.
9  Including intangibles would increase estimated corporate assets, and also estimated 
corporate profits, given that most expenditures on intangibles are immediately expensed for 
                                                 
9 See Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006) for recent estimates of the growth of business intangible assets in the 
United States.   17
tax purposes and hence deducted from income.
10  Thus, the estimated average tax rate would 
be reduced.  The impact on the estimated rate of profit is ambiguous, but it is certainly 
possible that accounting for intangibles would reduce the estimated rate of profit,
11 and this 
would lend credence to arguments that the profits reported for tax purposes have been 
increasingly understated in recent years as the result of aggressive tax avoidance behavior. 
  Some have argued that there is a widening gap between profits declared to tax 
authorities and some measure of “true” profits, and cite this gap as evidence of increasing 
dependence on tax shelters.  For example, Desai (2003) calculates that the standard 
adjustments to the income on tax returns yield predictions of book income falling 
increasingly short of actual book income over the course of the late 1990s.  This could be 
evidence of understated tax income, but also possibly of overstated book income or 
increasing error in the adjustments in translating tax income into estimated book income.  
Desai argues in favor of the first of these hypotheses, but the evidence is necessarily indirect, 
given the nature of tax shelters.  It is noteworthy, though, that the gap between book and tax 
income fell sharply after the late 1990s, actually becoming negative in 2001 (Plesko and 
Shumofsky 2004/5), suggesting perhaps that the unexplained gap between book income 
predicted from tax income and actual book income may have fallen as well.  Even if the tax-
book gap has declined or can be explained by other factors, though, the possible growth of 
tax shelters cannot be ruled out to the extent that they reduce both book and tax income 
measures.  Thus, it is very difficult to estimate the extent to which tax shelters and aggressive 
tax planning arrangements reduce current corporate tax collections. 
                                                 
10 Replacing current expenditures on intangibles with a measure of the depreciation of the intangibles stock 
would reduce estimated expenses and hence increased estimated profits as long as expenditures exceed 
depreciation, i.e., the stock of intangibles is growing, as seems surely to be the case. 
11 This would be the case if the adjustment to profits, relative to the stock of intangibles, was smaller than the 
previously estimated rate of profit.   18
VI. Conclusions 
As a share of GDP, U.S. federal tax revenues from nonfinancial corporations have 
held relatively constant since the early 1980s, after falling precipitously during the late 1960s 
and the 1970s.  But this relative constancy masks offsetting trends in the ratio of nonfinancial 
C corporation profits to GDP (declining) and the average tax rate on this profits (increasing).  
The recent upward spike in the average tax rate is largely extent attributable to the 
importance of tax losses, and casts some doubt on the importance of tax planning activities as 
a vehicle for reducing corporate taxes.  So, too, does the relative stability of the rate of profit, 
which might be expected to have declined had the understatement of profits for tax purposes 
been increasing.  Still, the year-to-year volatility of the measured rate of profit as well as the 
possibility that assets are being increasingly understated by the exclusion of intangibles limits 
our ability to draw conclusions about the extent of tax shelters and other aggressive corporate 
tax avoidance activity. 
The recent increase in the significance of tax losses may reflect a growing dispersion 
in profit outcomes among firms, which would be consistent with other recent evidence 
showing increasing firm-level volatility.  To the extent that increased dispersion and volatility 
are not simply temporary phenomena, the asymmetry of the corporate tax takes on more 
importance as a source of distortion and cyclical instability, presenting different firms with 
different incentives to invest and discouraging investment during periods of low profitability.  
Thus, the recent strength of corporate tax revenues need not lessen the need for corporate tax 
reform. 
Appendix 
  This appendix provides a brief review of the updated Auerbach-Poterba methodology 
and the data sources used, focusing on basic concepts and areas in which the methodology 
has been adapted.  Further details are provided in Auerbach and Poterba (1987), as well as in   19
an unpublished data appendix, available upon request, which describes the assumptions, 
imputations and interpolations that were required to deal with missing data and to separate 
NFC corporate profits from all corporate profits, to break NFC corporate profits into those of 
C and S corporations and into those of foreign-owned and domestic-owned corporations, and 
to deal with changing data definitions in the National Income and Product Accounts. 
  The methodology calculates the average tax rate on domestic income of nonfinancial 
C corporations and decomposes this average tax rate into a number of components.  By 
focusing on nonfinancial C corporations, we exclude the financial corporations that are 
subject to different tax rules and S corporations for which earnings are passed through to 
owners for tax purposes. 
  The first step in the methodology involves separate computations of taxes and profits 
for U.S. nonfinancial C corporations, using data from three sources, the National Income and 
Product Accounts produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA), information from 
tax returns compiled by the Statistics of Income division of the Internal Revenue Service 
(SOI), and the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve System (FOF).  Although 
most of the data are available either online or from published tables and articles, some 
individual components have been obtained from unpublished sources. 
Profits 
  The objective in estimating profits is to measure the real economic profits of 
nonfinancial C corporations.  The measure is based on expression (A1): 
 
(A1)    Profits = Income Subject to Tax (SOI) + Net Operating Loss Deductions  
      (SOI) + Negative Taxable Income (SOI) – Foreign Source Income  
      (SOI) + CCADJ (NIPA) + IVA (NIPA) + Debtgain (FOF) 
 
      = ISTT + NOL + NTI – FSI + CCADJ + IVA +DG   20
where the second, abbreviated version of the expression will be used below.   
  The first two components of this expression equal the income for tax purposes of 
taxable companies, before deductions for previous tax losses.  The third component is the 
income of companies with no tax liability, so the first three components together equal the 
income of all companies.  The fourth component is subtracted to obtain a measure of 
domestic income.  The fourth and fifth components, the capital consumption and inventory 
valuation adjustments from the national income accounts, are needed to convert income for 
tax purposes into a measure of economic income.  The final component of expression (A1) 
equals the gain to owners of corporations due to the inflation-induced decline in value of 
corporate liabilities, measured as the inflation rate multiplied by market value of the 
nonfinancial corporate credit-market debt.
12 
  Because information on the breakdown between C and S corporations is available 
only for data obtained from SOI, we assume that the breakdown between C and S 
corporations of the three remaining components in (A1) is the same as the sum of the first 
four. 
Taxes 
  No such breakdown of taxes between C and S nonfinancial corporations is needed, 
because only C corporations pay corporate income taxes.  Taxes are defined using the 
expression: 
 
(A2)    Taxes  = Income Taxes Before Credits (SOI) – Tax Credits (SOI) 
   –  Carryback  Refunds  (NIPA) + Other Retabulations (NIPA) 
  
   =   τλISTT – CB – ITC – FTC – OC + RETAB 
                                                 
12 The Flow of Funds Accounts provide only the book values of credit market debt.  We convert this series of 
book values into a series of estimated market values using a perpetual inventory method, starting in 1968 with 
the assumption that market and book values were the same in that year and assuming that each year’s gross 
issues of debt had a maturity of 30 years and carried level coupon payments at the year of issue’s Baa corporate 
bond rate, taken from the Economic Report of the President.   21
 
where the second, abbreviated version will be used below.  This version breaks tax credits 
into three components, the investment tax credit (ITC), the foreign tax credit (FTC) and other 
credits, and defines the parameter λ implicitly as the adjustment to the statutory tax rate,τ, 
required to make the product of income subject to tax (ISTT) and the tax rate equal to income 
taxes before credits. This adjustment accounts not only for the very minor progressivity in the 
regular corporate tax code, but also for variations in tax payments due to the application of 
the corporate minimum tax, which when applicable imposes a different tax base and a 
different tax rate. 
Average Tax Rate Decomposition 
  Dividing expression (A2) by (A1) and rearranging terms yields: 
 
(A3)   Taxes/Profits  =  τ – τλ(ccadj + itc) – τλ(iva + dg) – [τλ(nol + nti) + cb] 
    –  (ftc  –  τλfsi) – τ(1 – λ) – (oc – retab) 
 
where lower case variables equal the corresponding upper case variables in (A1) and (A2) 
divided by Profits as defined in (A1).  Expression (A3) provides the breakdown used in Table 
3, starting from the statutory tax rate, τ, and accounting for adjustments for, respectively, 
capital recovery, other inflation effects, tax losses, foreign tax effects, tax progressivity, and 
other factors.  Each of these adjustments is defined as a reduction in the effective tax rate, but 
it is logically possible in most cases for the adjustments to increase taxes rather than 
decreasing them. 
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